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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK THE LAW

DIANE E. HOFFMANN*
The medical profession has, of course, many dedicated people who give of
themselves and literally sacrifice their own interests for the sake of their
patients. The point is that medicine has its share of both angels and
scoundrels.1
INTRODUCTION
In her article, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad
Law” Claims Seriously, Sandra Johnson focuses on doctors who comply with
the law despite their belief that the law is “bad,” i.e., causes them to behave in
ways that are harmful to their patients.2 Physicians who obey laws they claim
are bad may hurt patients by failing to treat them or treating them
inappropriately. They may under-medicate their patients or subject them to
unnecessary procedures or tests. These laws may also have a “chilling effect”
on physician behavior, causing them not only to inadequately treat their own
patients but also to refuse to see certain types of patients, e.g., those who are
“the sickest or highest-risk,”3 or to provide patients with certain kinds of

* Professor of Law; Associate Dean for Academic Programs; and Director, Law and Health Care
Program at the University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to express my thanks to my
colleagues Richard Boldt, Sandra Johnson and Jack Schwartz for comments on earlier drafts of
this article and to research fellow, Susan McCarty, for her invaluable assistance.
1. DAVID MECHANIC, MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY 116 (2d ed. 1978), quoted in Paul D. Jesilow
et al., Medical Criminals: Physicians and White-Collar Offenses, 2 JUST. Q. 149, 163 (1985).
2. Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009). Johnson provides the following examples of bad law
claims:
[M]alpractice litigation that makes doctors practice “defensive medicine”; . . . patients’
rights that make doctors provide futile care; . . . controlled substances laws that require
[doctors] to neglect their patients in pain or to deny their patients the sterile injection tools
that would prevent the spread of disease; . . . antitrust laws that prevent doctors from
organizing themselves in ways that would produce more cost-effective and accessible
care; and . . . regulations that impede important medical research.
Id. at 974–75 (footnotes omitted).
3. John Liederbach et al., The Criminalization of Physician Violence: Social Control in
Transformation?, 18 JUST. Q. 141, 165 (2001).
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treatment or services.4 Such physicians may be described as overly cautious or
as “over-complying” with the law. They stay far away from the line
demarcating what is legal and illegal.5
There are a number of reasons why physicians might over-comply with the
law, e.g., the law’s complexity and uncertainty, the fact that they
misunderstand the law, or the possibility that they have unique personal
characteristics that make them more sensitive (i.e., risk averse) to
entanglements with the law.6 Research on the deterrence value of law has
shown that “[p]eople who have conventional values or strong social ties are . . .
easier to deter, possibly because arrest—or other legal action—brings the
offence to the attention of other (conventional) people who matter to them and
thereby jeopardise valued social relationships.”7 In the case of physicians,
such action would also significantly affect their reputation, and thus may lead
to hypersensitivity to possible arrest for violation of the law.

4. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Commentary, Abortion Politics: Clinical Freedom, Trust
in the Judiciary, and the Autonomy of Women, 298 JAMA 1562, 1563 (2007) (arguing that the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124 (2007), will have a chilling effect on physician willingness to perform procedures used to end
medically dangerous pregnancies); Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug
Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST.
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 309 (2008) (describing the chilling effect of the Controlled
Substances Act and its enforcement on physician willingness to treat chronic pain patients or to
prescribe opioids for pain management); Blaine Harden, Court Rules on Aided Suicide, WASH.
POST, May 27, 2004, at A2 (stating that the 2001 “Ashcroft Order,” regarding the illegality of
prescribing controlled substances for assisted suicide, had a chilling effect on Oregon physicians
carrying out requests under Oregon’s assisted suicide law).
5. These physicians practice in a way that is in the 40%–60% range, rather than the 30%–
70% range, of the safe harbor that Professor Johnson describes. See Johnson, supra note 2, at
1018–22. Johnson uses an illustration to show how doctors often operate well inside the “safe
harbor” range. She asks the reader to
assume a range of interventions from 1 to 100, and that the range of appropriate treatment
lies between 10 to 90. To retain a margin for prosecutorial or regulatory discretion in
individual cases, the clinical safe harbor is set to cover behavior in the range of 30 to 70.
This means that while doctors practicing in the range between 10 and 30 and between 70
and 90 are engaged in legitimate medical practice, they simply are not guaranteed
protection from government scrutiny.
Id. at 1021. She asserts, “[t]he risk-averse doctor who fears investigation and potential
prosecution by enforcement agencies and the rational doctor who calculates the risks and benefits
of choosing to treat one type of patient over another both stay well within the identified safe
harbors.” Id.
6. See id. at 978 (stating that there has been some research on the training of physicians
indicating that they have a “heightened sensitivity to shame associated with errors, a refined
notion of the centrality of character, and the attachment of serious moral content to breaches of
particular, but not all, standards of behavior”).
7. Jonathan P. Shepherd, Criminal Deterrence as a Public Health Strategy, 358 LANCET
1717, 1719 (2001) (footnote omitted).
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Physicians who over-comply with the law may also overestimate the
probability of being identified or captured in a law enforcement net. Stories in
the media about physicians who are arrested and prosecuted, that focus on
arbitrary or prejudicial enforcement, also undoubtedly fuel physician fears of
the law.8
While the large majority of physicians operate within the law, there are
some who do not. These physicians may not share the same personal traits as
other physicians that lead to hypersensitivity of being caught for lawbreaking.
In this essay, I explore why physicians break the law, how law enforcement
responds when they do, and what, if anything, we can learn from cases about
physicians who break the law, about the laws they break and their
enforcement. In this exploration, I focus on two areas of physician
lawbreaking: (1) violations of business-related laws (non-clinical), and (2)
violations of laws relating directly to patient care. The first area deals
primarily with physician failure to comply with laws addressing insurance
fraud; the second, with situations where physicians violate the law in order to
provide what they believe is clinically appropriate care to their patients.
I. PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK FRAUD LAWS
Some of the most common violations of the law by physicians involve
insurance fraud, overstepping sexual boundaries, and drug abuse or diversion
of controlled substances.9 The question of why physicians engage in violations
of the law in these areas has been underexplored in the literature.10 The
reasons, no doubt, differ with the type of crime. Although none of these
crimes by physicians have been studied extensively, insurance fraud appears to
be the most common type of lawbreaking by physicians and the crime for
which there is the most abundant information. Insurance fraud involves crimes

8. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239–40 (describing the case of Dr. Frank Fisher,
who spent five months in jail prior to a hearing at which the charges against him for murder were
dismissed or reduced and later dropped due to insufficient evidence); see also Chad D. Kollas et
al., Criminal Prosecutions of Physicians Providing Palliative or End-of-Life Care, 11 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 233, 235 (2008) (describing the case of Dr. Robert Weitzel, in which the
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence).
9. See George J. Annas, Medicine, Death, and the Criminal Law, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED.
527, 527 (1995) (“Criminal charges related to the practice of medicine have primarily involved
insurance fraud (including Medicare and Medicaid fraud), sexual abuse of patients, or illegal use
or prescription of controlled substances.”).
10. See Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 149, 151–52 (“Few textbooks on deviance or
criminology attend to offenses by physicians, probably because of the respect, power, and trust
that the profession engenders. In addition, there is little systematic investigative or social science
work on the range of illegal medical acts. In part, this results because access to information is
difficult to obtain, as the strength of the profession has served to protect it from close scrutiny.”
(citation omitted)).
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in which physicians knowingly defraud commercial or government insurers, in
particular, Medicare and Medicaid, by making a false statement or
representation in connection with payment for services rendered or
participation in an insurance program.11 The laws governing these behaviors,
at their most basic level, apply a generally accepted moral value (i.e., do not
steal) to our current government and commercial health insurance programs.
Insurance fraud is considered a type of white-collar crime,12 and while
much of white-collar crime focuses on corporate offenses, these crimes also
include lawbreaking by professionals. Perhaps the first person to write about
physicians as white-collar criminals was Edwin H. Sutherland. In his 1949
book, White Collar Crime,13 Sutherland included crimes by doctors, as he
believed studying their violations of the law could provide “particularly
important information in assessing why persons who seemingly have no ‘real’
or ‘true’ need to enrich themselves nevertheless do so by illegal means.”14 In
the book, Sutherland listed the types of crimes committed by doctors at the
time. They included “illegal sales of alcohol and narcotics, abortion, illegal
services to underworld criminals, fraudulent reports and testimony in accident
cases, fraud in income tax returns, extreme instances of unnecessary treatment
and surgical operations, fake specialists, restriction of competition, and feesplitting.”15
Today, doctors commit white-collar crimes when they take kickbacks on
referrals or prescriptions, order questionable procedures or inaccurately report
procedures, overbill patients and insurers, bill for services they have not
provided, or bill for patients and clinical entities that do not exist. Empirical
research on why physicians commit white-collar crime reveals that, for the
most part, it is for the same reasons that other professionals do: the belief,
which is in large part true, that the probability of getting caught is low,16 the
opportunity is readily available, and the reward is potentially great. Whitecollar crimes, such as fraud, are also relatively easy to hide and hard to
11. Such false billing involving federal health care plans constitutes a federal crime and, in
most cases, a felony. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS 1009 (5th ed. 2004).
12. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 317 (Lawrence M. Salinger
ed., 2005).
13. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
14. Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 152 (discussing Sutherland’s view on doctors’ violations
of the law). The authors further state that “Sutherland was also interested in decimating
contemporary theories which insisted that Freudian complexes, immigrant status, and poverty
‘caused’ crime: doctors and other white-collar criminals, he noted, rarely fell into such
categories.” Id.
15. SUTHERLAND, supra note 13, at 12.
16. Relative to their incidence, arrests are very rarely made. White-collar crime is rarely
prosecuted, and individuals who are prosecuted are rarely convicted. ERICH GOODE, DEVIANT
BEHAVIOR 218–19 (8th ed. 2008).
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detect.17 The acts tend to “be made up of complex, sophisticated, and
relatively technical actions” and “intermingled with legitimate behavior.”18
In a 1991 JAMA article, Fraud by Physicians Against Medicaid,19 the
authors report on their interviews of over forty physicians who ran afoul of the
Medicaid fraud and abuse laws. They consistently found that the physicians
viewed the violation as easy—there was no known victim, only an impersonal
billing process—and they simply had to check a procedure on a form that was
more expensive than the procedure actually performed, or inflate the amount of
time they spent with a patient.20
Physicians, like other professionals, also engage in white-collar crimes for
personal reasons such as striving to achieve a certain lifestyle or because of an
economic or family crisis. The literature indicates that white-collar criminals
are motivated by two factors: economic difficulty and greed.21 Often the
behavior that enables a physician to engage in fraud is partially learned from
others in the profession as “professional values may effectively neutralize [the
doctor’s] conflicts of conscience.”22 In justifying Medicaid fraud, for example,
some physicians said they did it to make back what was owed them, alluding to
the low Medicaid reimbursement rates.23 Moreover, “occupational norms may
support an attitude on the part of some professionals that they are ‘above the
law.’”24
Interviews with physicians prosecuted for Medicaid fraud revealed a group
of people reluctant to say that greed was the reason for their behavior; they
were more likely to attribute it to carelessness and to see themselves as
“sacrificial lambs hung out to dry” by disgruntled employees, “stupid laws,” or
“bureaucratic nonsense.”25 They also felt that the Medicaid rules, which can
be “mercilessly nitpicking,” stood “in the way of important and humane
service demands.”26 They resented the outside control of these regulations on

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Paul Jesilow et al., Fraud by Physicians Against Medicaid, 266 JAMA 3318 (1991).
20. Id. The authors provide examples of physicians who billed 4800 hours in a year, who
billed for services to persons who were dead, or billed for services when they were on vacation.
Id. at 3319. One physician performed abortions on women who were not pregnant and in one
case on a woman who had had a hysterectomy. Id.
21. See ALEX THIO, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 343–44 (6th ed. 2001) (discussing the causes of
white-collar crime).
22. Jesilow et al., supra note 19, at 3321.
23. Id. at 3320.
24. See PAUL JESILOW ET AL., PRESCRIPTION FOR PROFIT: HOW DOCTORS DEFRAUD
MEDICAID (1993), as reprinted in ABOUT CRIMINALS 156 (Mark Pogrebin ed., 2004) (“A
subculture of medical delinquency . . . arises, thrives, and grows in large part because of the
tension between bureaucratic regulation and professional norms of autonomy.”).
25. Jesilow et al., supra note 19, at 3320.
26. JESILOW ET AL., supra note 24, at 150.
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their independence and autonomy.27 An example given by one physician
prosecuted for Medicaid fraud was his treatment “of a fourteen-year-old girl
who was having her third abortion in less than six months. He had given the
girl birth control pills, but she obviously hadn’t taken them. When she came
back for the third abortion, he coaxed her into allowing him to insert an IUD,”
telling her he could insert it right after he performed the abortion.28 Medicaid
would not pay for the IUD insertion because the IUD was “done at the same
time as the abortion.”29 The physician “subsequently got into difficulty in part
by falsifying the dates that he did the two procedures.”30
Clearly, this physician viewed the law that prevented him from billing for
the procedure under these circumstances as “bad law.” The rule was
established in light of the fact that when the two covered procedures are
performed together the cost to the physician of the insertion of the IUD is
nominal—”the small cost of the IUD and the minimal extra time to insert it.”31
Before the advent of Medicaid, the physician might have performed such a
service for free, yet, in this case, he was not willing to forgo the additional
small expense of the IUD insertion. Instead, he felt cheated because he was
unable to charge for the full cost of the procedure (which included a new office
visit).32 He chose to frame the issue as one in which his patient would be
harmed if he required her to come back for a second visit as she would be
unlikely to return and might become pregnant again.33
The view that the Medicaid rules and their enforcement are unfair and
irrational was a common perspective among those interviewed. One
respondent “insisted that Medicaid not only invited but demanded cheating.”34
He appeared to resent the fact that the enforcers were not “medical people” and
described them as knowing “nothing about the services being provided.”35 He
defended his actions by saying:
They’ve built in systems that either ask for somebody to cheat . . . or to cheat
the patient on the type of care that’s provided. You put somebody in the
position where lying is the most reasonable course, and they will lie. The

27. See id. at 156.
28. Id. at 153.
29. Id.
30. Jesilow, supra note 19, at 3320.
31. JESILOW ET AL., supra note 24, at 154.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 153. The case description does not indicate whether the alleged wrongdoing
occurred before or after the 1976 Hyde Amendment, which prohibited Medicaid payment for
abortion except under narrow circumstances. See Hyde Amendment of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439,
§ 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(c)(1), (7) (2000)). Most
likely, however, it occurred prior to 1976 when many states covered abortions under Medicaid.
34. JESILOW ET AL., supra note 24, at 154.
35. Id.
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patients will lie; the doctor may even lie on what they say about what
36
happened.

Physicians may obtain their views about compliance with the Medicare
and Medicaid programs as early as medical school. In a study of medical
student attitudes toward physicians who committed Medicare or Medicaid
fraud, Keenan et al. gave students a series of hypotheticals, based on real cases,
in which physicians violated the fraud and abuse laws and asked them what
sort of sanctions the physicians should receive for their violations of the law.37
Thirty-five percent (35%) of the respondents blamed the government
programs, rather than the physicians, for violation of the program rules.38 The
students cited several programmatic features as contributors to physicians’
fraudulent behavior. These included the low level of reimbursement, the
paperwork and bureaucracy, and the programs’ inefficiency.39 By blaming the
programs, the students shifted the responsibility for the wrongful acts away
from the physicians and toward the flaws of the programs themselves.40 The
authors concluded that “[s]tudents believed that the regulations and policies
governing these programs actually promoted fraud and abuse among
physicians, despite the voluntary nature of physician participation.”41
Physicians may also engage in private insurance fraud, which can be the
basis of criminal arrest and prosecution under various state laws42 as well as
under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).43 In the 1990s, due to the use of utilization review in managed care
plans, many physicians reported pressure to alter a patient’s medical records to
support insurance coverage for the patient’s treatment. In a survey of over 700
physicians, Wynia et al. sought to determine “whether financial pressures,
practice characteristics, and/or . . . personal characteristics influence
physicians’ use of deception with third party payers.”44 The survey was
36. Id. at 155.
37. Constance E. Keenan et al., Medical Students’ Attitudes on Physician Fraud and Abuse
in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs, 60 J. MED. EDUC. 167 (1985).
38. Id. at 172.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Illinois Insurance Claims Fraud Prevention Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
92/1 to 92/45 (2002); New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:33A-1
to -30 (West 1994 & Supp. 2008).
43. Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§§ 241–50, 110 Stat. 1936, 2016 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2006)).
44. M. Wynia et al., Physician Responses to Utilization Review Pressures: Results of a
National Physician Survey, in SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ASS’N HEALTH SERVICES
RESEARCH ANNUAL MEETING JUNE 21–23 1998, at 244 (1999) [hereinafter Wynia, Physician
Responses to Utilization Review Pressures], available at http://gateway.nlm.nih.gov/Meeting
Abstracts/ma?f=102193686.html. The study results were published in further detail in JAMA.
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conducted in 1998 and the results were reported at a 1999 meeting of the
Association of Health Services Researchers. Of the 61% who responded,
28% had exaggerated the severity of patients’ conditions to help them avoid
early discharge from the hospital; 23% had changed official (billing) diagnoses
to help patients secure coverage for needed treatments or services; and 9% had
reported symptoms that patients did not actually have to help them secure
45
coverage for needed treatments.

Those physicians who engaged in these deceptive practices were more likely
than their colleagues to be “less satisfied with medical practice, less financially
secure, . . . less likely to report having enough time during patient visits, more
likely to find insurance company intrusions annoying, and more likely to
believe that ‘gaming the system’ for patients was necessary to provide high
quality care.”46 Moreover, these physicians were not swayed by the threat of
prosecution as they believed their actions were necessary for the health of their
patients. Interestingly, while a large majority of respondents (87%) believed
that all physicians had a responsibility to try to contain health care costs, 55%
said “they would be more aggressive in cost control efforts if they knew that
money saved would go towards serving more needy patients.”47
While fraud laws are an effort to protect the public purse and insurance
monies that are part of a communal fund, and they may also protect patients
(e.g., from unnecessary procedures), physicians claim complying with them
may hurt patients. This claim often reflects a misconception, however, when it
is not compliance with the fraud laws that hurts patients but compliance with
some other law, regulation, or policy. For example, physicians may violate
commercial insurance fraud regulations because they disagree with the
insurance policies or the interpretation of the policies by the insurance
company. Most often this occurs when it is the physician’s medical opinion
that the proposed treatment or continued treatment is medically necessary. In
the context of Medicare and Medicaid fraud, it is the billing rules that some
physicians argue encourage care that harms patients, e.g., rules that encourage
physicians to have patients come back for a second visit in order to charge for
a procedure that could be done during the first visit.48
Matthew K. Wynia et al., Physician Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for Patients: Between
a Rock and a Hard Place, 283 JAMA 1858, 1861 (2000) [hereinafter Wynia, Physician
Manipulation of Reimbursement Rules for Patients].
45. Wynia, Physician Responses to Utilization Review Pressures, supra note 44, at 244.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule
for Calendar Year 2006, 70 Fed. Reg. 70116, 70261 (Nov. 21, 2005) (stating that the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reimburses a same-visit, second procedure at 50% of the
fee schedule rate, and that “the multiple procedure payment reduction for surgery . . . has been a
longstanding policy”).
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II. HOW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM TREATS PHYSICIANS WHO VIOLATE
FRAUD LAWS
When physicians intentionally violate the fraud laws, most of us would
agree that they should be punished, perhaps more harshly than
nonprofessionals who commit more routine street-crimes, given their
privileged position in society. Yet white-collar criminals, more broadly, are
perceived to be treated less harshly than nonprofessionals. There is little data,
however, to determine whether that perception is valid.49 Whether or not
physicians who commit fraud are treated more or less harshly by the criminal
justice system requires information about several components of the system: at
the front end, whether physicians are arrested and prosecuted more frequently
than non-physicians engaging in similar crimes; and at the back end, whether
physicians are convicted more or less frequently and whether they are
sanctioned more or less harshly than non-physicians committing similar
crimes.
As regards law enforcement efforts to identify and arrest physicians who
engage in fraud, considerable resources are being used to detect and combat
medical fraud. At the federal level, such efforts by the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) were
“consolidated and strengthened” by the passage of HIPAA.50 In enacting
HIPAA, Congress directed the Secretary of DHHS and the Attorney General to
establish a “joint Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program and created a
dedicated funding stream for health care fraud and abuse control activities.”51
Resources devoted to Medicaid fraud control at the state level have also
increased.52 The additional resources for detection of physicians engaging in

49. In fact, there is some evidence to show the opposite. Based on a vignette study, Rosoff
found that “for serious offenses (homicides not related to medical practice), respondents allocate
harsher verdicts to physicians with higher-status specialties.” Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at
163 (citing Stephen M. Rosoff, Physicians as Criminal Defendants: Specialty, Sanctions, and
Status Liability, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231 (1989)). Also, Shaw and Skolnick found that an
offender’s status may “increase harshness [of the sanction] when the [offense] is related to
professional practice (an altercation in the office with a patient).” Id. (citing Jerry I. Shaw & Paul
Skolnick, When Is Defendant Status a Shield or a Liability?: Clarification and Extension, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 431 (1996)).
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1998 (1999),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/98hipaa_ar.htm [hereinafter DHHS & DOJ, ANNUAL REPORT].
51. Budgeting to Fight Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Budget, 110th Cong. 8 (July 17, 2007) (statement of Mike O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Health & Human Services).
52. Jeffrey Blumengold & Christopher Panczner, ForThoughts—Edition 5: The Shifting
Landscape of Health Care Fraud and Regulatory Compliance, DELOITTE,
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/article/0,1002,cid%253D218791,00.html (last visited May 12, 2009).
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fraud and abuse have significantly increased the number of physician arrests
and prosecutions.53
While insurance fraud continues to be difficult to detect, law enforcement
agents are assisted in their efforts by False Claims Act relators or “whistleblowers.”54 In some cases, the relator may be a prior employee, in others he or
she may be a patient. Relators are entitled to a percentage of the government’s
recovery and therefore have an incentive to come forth with information.55
More recently, law enforcement agencies have created programs to “ferret out
fraud through data matching, data mining, and . . . the hiring of contractors to
go out as third parties to look for fraud, waste, abuse, or errors.”56
In order to determine whether physicians are treated differently than
nonprofessionals once they are arrested, we would need to know whether they
are more or less likely to be prosecuted and convicted. Writing twenty-five
years ago, Jesilow, Pontell, and Geis asserted that “[t]he status of doctors
preclude[d] the rough and insensitive treatment often accorded to street
offenders,”57 and quoted a federal agent in support of their observation who
said:
U.S. attorneys are extraordinarily kind to doctors, because even if they are
crooks, theoretically they’re still providing some useful services for the
community. . . . There’s a double standard for doctors because there aren’t
many other categories of white-collar criminals that are looked upon as a
58
community of people who save lives.

Today, that does not appear to be the case, at least with respect to health care
fraud. According to a joint annual report by DHHS and DOJ, “[f]ederal
prosecutors filed 322 criminal health care fraud cases in 1998—a 14 percent
increase over the previous year.”59 During that same year, “326 defendants

53. See RONALD T. LIBBY, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MEDICINE: AMERICA’S WAR ON
DOCTORS 40 (2008) (“The number of fraud investigators in the OIG of HHS increased by 40
percent from 1998 to 2005. In 1998, there were 260 auditors and 136 criminal investigators. In
2006, there were 1,500 investigators and attorneys.”). In addition, “FBI health fraud
investigations increased by more than 400 percent from 591 in 1992 to 2,547 cases in 2005.” Id.
54. See Joan H. Krause, A Patient-Centered Approach to Health Care Fraud Recovery, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 585 (2006) (discussing the False Claims Act’s status as the
“centerpiece of the government’s anti-fraud efforts”).
55. See id. (noting that relators can “retain fifteen to thirty percent of the proceeds”). See
also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2007 5 (2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2007.pdf (reporting that $122 million in recovered
funds were awarded to relators in fiscal year 2007).
56. Blumengold & Panczner, supra note 52.
57. Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 161.
58. Id. (alteration in original).
59. See DHHS & DOJ, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK THE LAW

1059

were convicted of health care fraud-related crimes.”60 A decade later, “[i]n
fiscal year 2007, the federal government alone initiated 878 criminal . . .
investigations . . . and was successful in obtaining 560 criminal convictions.”61
While in many cases the physicians enter into a plea bargain with the
prosecutor, if the case goes to trial, often the outcome is based on the
sympathies of the jury and the judge. As regards whether white-collar
criminals (not physicians specifically) are incarcerated more or less frequently
than others, in 2002 Paul Rosenzweig, a Senior Research Fellow in the Center
for Legal and Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation, testified on the
question before the Senate Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs.62 Based on an
empirical study of past crimes, he found that when one controls for nondiscretionary sentencing (i.e., takes out crimes that were subject to federal
sentencing guidelines and just looks at those where judges had discretion as
between incarceration and a non-jail alternative) the results are equivocal—
professionals have not been treated less harshly or more harshly than others.63
Lengths of prison sentences, however, have been largely determined by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were put in place to address sentencing
disparities. In establishing the Guidelines, the Federal Sentencing Commission
looked at past practices and collected data on more than 40,000 cases.64 While
the Commission was guided by historical data, it chose to depart from past
practices in crimes of an economic or regulatory nature, as those crimes had
been punished “less severely than other apparently equivalent behavior.”65
Consequently, the Guidelines made “an effort to upgrade the penalties for
regulatory and economic, white-collar offenses.”66 In addition, Rosenzweig
found that “courts d[id] not appear to depart from the [federal sentencing]
guidelines with any greater frequency in white-collar cases than in street-crime
cases.”67

60. Id.
61. Blumengold & Panczner, supra note 52.
62. Penalties for White Collar Crime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 144 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenzweig Testimony]
(testimony of Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Legal Research Fellow, Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies, The Heritage Foundation).
63. Id. at 148.
64. Id. at 151.
65. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id.; see also Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 147 (stating that historical inequities in
the treatment of white-collar and street-crimes have led to a “commitment to equal treatment
under the law”).
67. Rosenzweig Testimony, supra note 62, at 150. Rosenzweig’s analysis was based on
decisions made before 2005, when the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), found that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as originally constituted violated the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury and struck down provisions of the law making them mandatory.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory—judges are not required to follow them but
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There is no specific data as to whether physicians are incarcerated with any
more frequency than non-physicians or whether they are subject to shorter or
longer prison terms. However, physicians who violate fraud laws today are
subject to more significant penalties than was the case ten to twelve years
ago—”[s]ince 1996, the fines and prison sentences for medical doctors have
dramatically increased. The amount of the fraud is now tripled plus $10,000 is
added for each instance of overbilling.”68 This increase in fines has significant
implications. Prosecutors often “use the federal . . . sentencing guidelines to
intimidate doctors into pleading guilty to felonies and paying huge fines in
exchange for a reduced prison sentence.”69 Based on this data, it appears that
physicians who break fraud laws are treated at least comparably to, and
arguably more harshly than, those who commit common law fraud.70
Moreover, it appears that some physicians are prosecuted for unintentional
violations of the law. Physicians, for example, who bill Medicare for lab tests
that are not recognized by Medicare, or who bill for a procedure or service
using the wrong HCPCS/CPT code,71 may be deemed to have engaged in a
criminal offense.72 The absence of intent is not determinative. While the
must use them as a reference. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, while not bound to
apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.”). Prior to Booker, judges were able to depart from the Guidelines only under
specified circumstances, most notably when a defendant provided substantial assistance to the
prosecution. See LISA M. SEGHETTI & ALISON M. SMITH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS, at
CRS-15 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32766.pdf.
68. LIBBY, supra note 53, at 25. Violations of the False Claims Act may include criminal
prosecution as well as civil and administrative actions and penalties. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286–287
(2006) (providing for fines and prison sentences of up to five years for fraud against the
government and up to ten years for conspiracy to defraud). Often both criminal and civil charges
are brought. The statutory fines are designated under the civil provisions of the False Claims Act.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006). The penalties of $5,000 to $10,000 per offense have been
adjusted upward to account for inflation. See Civil Monetary Policies Inflation Adjustment, 28
C.F.R. § 85.3(9) (2008).
69. LIBBY, supra note 53, at 25.
70. Other white-collar fraud committed in the business setting is also subject to harsh
penalties. Revisions to the Sentencing Guidelines, including significant increases in prison
sentences and fines, for individuals and corporations convicted of white-collar and financial
crimes were made in response to a congressional directive in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See
Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 721, 726–27 (2005).
71. HCPCS/CPT codes are codes assigned by Medicare and other insurers to each medical
service performed by a physician for purposes of uniformity of reimbursement.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Janati, No. 05-4255, 2007 WL 2197065, at **1 (4th Cir. Aug.
1, 2007) (physician convicted of criminal fraud for using wrong code for office visits). Correctly
coding claims is apparently quite difficult. See Mitchell S. King et al., Accuracy of CPT
Evaluation and Management Coding by Family Physicians, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 184,
188 (2001) (noting the “substantial” coding error rate in a survey of 600 physicians).
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mental state required to find criminal liability under the False Claims Act is a
“knowing” violation, i.e., the physician knowingly submitted a false claim,73
the knowledge standard may be satisfied by a showing of “conscious
avoidance” of knowledge of the truth or “reckless disregard” for the truth.74 In
addition, under the False Claims Act, civil penalties may be imposed when a
physician “acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information, and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.”75
Prosecutors, in a number of cases, have stretched the boundaries of
“reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” and courts have
differed in the interpretation of the phrase, with some equating it with
“aggravated gross negligence”76 and others requiring something closer to
intentional harm. Because it is often difficult to determine whether a physician
intentionally submitted a false claim or committed an error, physicians have
been criminally charged when they mistakenly submit the wrong billing code
for a patient. In a recent case, a federal judge found that the government’s
criminal fraud case against a physician was frivolous because the government
failed to provide evidence of the defendant’s requisite mental state.77 The
defendant was awarded nearly $300,000 in legal fees.78 A criminal law
professor who worked with the defendant on the case commented that often in
these cases “[the government] is just looking at CPT code usage and anybody
out on the tail of the distribution is targeted for criminal prosecution” even if
there is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing.79 Doctors in these cases often

73. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (providing criminal liability for any claim, or claims, presented to
the U.S. Government that is “knowing[ly] . . . false, fictitious, or fraudulent”). Cf. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 (providing civil liability for false claims “knowingly” presented to the government for
payment or approval); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (providing criminal liability for false claims
“knowingly” submitted to a health care benefit program).
74. See United States v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255, 258 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding jury
instructions interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 287, which permitted the jurors to “infer knowledge from a
combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth” (emphasis omitted)); United States v.
Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822 (11th Cir. 1984) (approving the use of a “conscious avoidance” jury
instruction in medical fraud case against optician).
75. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 111 F.3d 934, 941–42 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
77. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Judge Rules Criminal Fraud Case Against Idaho Doctor Is
Frivolous, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 20, 2007, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/08/20/
gvsb0820.htm.
78. Id.
79. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jeffrey S. Parker, Professor of Law, George Mason
University) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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settle “even when they did nothing wrong, because the financial stakes are so
high,” and sometimes they face significant jail time.80
III. PHYSICIANS WHO BREAK LAWS INVOLVING PATIENT CARE
A second category of laws that physicians break govern clinical practice
and patient treatment rather than business-related activities. Examples range
from prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients or medical marijuana for
cancer patients to helping a terminally ill patient end his or her life.
In the case of physicians who break the law regarding prescribing of
opioids, reasons may vary from greed to a desire to appropriately treat their
patients’ pain. Under the Controlled Substances Act81 (CSA), to find a
physician guilty of criminal violation of the law for prescribing controlled
substances, the prosecution must prove that the physician knowingly or
intentionally prescribed outside “the usual course of . . . professional practice”
or not for a “legitimate medical purpose.”82 In some cases, physicians
intentionally violate the law by knowingly prescribing without a medical
purpose. Generally, the purpose of such prescribing is monetary gain or sexual
favors; physicians demand such benefits in exchange for the prescription. The
“patient” may need the drug to feed an addiction or may sell it on the street. In
these circumstances, law enforcement is ideally swift and harsh.83
On the other hand, physicians may violate the CSA in order to treat their
patients. In these cases, they may believe they are complying with the law as
they are prescribing for a legitimate medical purpose and within, what they
believe, is the usual course of professional practice. Dozens of physicians
have been arrested for what they argue is appropriate treatment of chronic pain
patients.84 An example is Dr. William Hurwitz. Hurwitz, who practiced in
northern Virginia, was arrested for prescribing large dosages of opioids that
prosecutors alleged were related to several deaths.85 Yet, many of his patients
asserted that he had greatly improved the quality of their lives, and a number of

80. Id. (citing Robert S. Salcido, attorney in Washington, D.C. and former Justice
Department civil fraud lawyer); see also Roccy DeFrancesco, Surplus Medicare Fraud Insurance,
PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIGEST, July 2005, http://www.physiciansnews.com/finance/705.html.
81. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
82. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2008).
83. See Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 236–38 (providing statistics and description of a number
of cases in which physicians have been investigated, arrested, and prosecuted for prescribing
controlled substances).
84. See id. at 239–56 (describing the cases of Drs. Frank Fisher, Cecil Knox, William
Hurwitz, Jeri Hassman, and Ronald McIver).
85. Id. at 246.
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pain experts described him as a caring physician.86 Hurwitz was initially
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, despite the prosecution’s argument
that he should receive a life sentence.87 The sentence was subsequently
reduced to fifty-seven months after he successfully appealed the initial
conviction on the grounds that the court wrongly “instructed the jury that it
could not consider Hurwitz’s ‘good faith’ in his prescribing.”88
Physicians have also been arrested and prosecuted in California for
growing and dispensing marijuana for cancer and HIV patients. California
passed the country’s first law permitting physicians to “prescribe” marijuana
for medical purposes in 1996.89 The law, also known as Proposition 215,
requires patients who wish to grow or buy marijuana to treat their symptoms to
obtain written or oral authorization from their physician.90 Such patients and
their designated primary care givers are protected from criminal prosecution
under California law for obtaining, possessing, or cultivating marijuana for
patients’ personal medical use. Physicians who comply with the state law,
however, can be prosecuted for violation of the federal CSA, which categorizes
marijuana as a Schedule I drug that cannot lawfully be prescribed for any
reason.91 According to medical marijuana advocates, an estimated 1500
physicians in California, “mostly oncologists and AIDS specialists,” have
authorized medical marijuana for a patient.92 However, most of the
authorizations have been from a small group of about a dozen physicians.93 In
2005, Dr. Mollie Fry was arrested by federal drug agents for growing
marijuana and issuing written authorizations to many patients.94 Fry, “a cancer
survivor who learned about the benefits of medical marijuana while enduring
chemotherapy and a double mastectomy,”95 set up a practice in a small town in

86. One physician said he was “doing heroic things for his patients.” Id. at 247 (quoting Dr.
James Campbell, Professor of Neurosurgery and Director of the Blaustein Pain Treatment Center
at Johns Hopkins University).
87. Id. at 249.
88. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 249.
89. California Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5
(West Supp. 2009).
90. Id. § 11362.5(d).
91. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
92. Lisa Leff, Calif. ‘Pot Docs’ Put Selves at Risk, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Nov. 5, 2006,
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/04/AR2006110400516_pf.html.
93. Id.
94. Dean E. Murphy, Arrests Follow Searches in Medical Marijuana Raids, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2005, at A12 (noting that Fry wrote a recommendation for marijuana to an undercover
federal agent, which Fry’s husband, Dale Schafer, filled).
95. New Book Exposes the First Federal Trial of a Medical Marijuana Doctor, MED.
MARIJUANA AM., Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.medicalmarijuanaofamerica.com/content/view/
246/110/ (reviewing VANESSA NELSON, COOL MADNESS: THE TRIAL OF DR. MOLLIE FRY AND
DALE SCHAFER (2008)).
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northern California “and began recommending medical marijuana to her
patients in accordance with state law.”96 Under federal law, Fry was able to
recommend marijuana use to her patients97 but was not able to grow it for her
patients or for herself.98 Fry believed that she was doing the right thing for her
patients and was willing to go to jail for it.99 She was sentenced to a five year
prison sentence, the minimum sentence based on the volume of marijuana that
she had cultivated.100 Judge Damrell, in sentencing the defendant, stated that
he took “no pleasure in imposing [the] sentence,”101 implying that the
recommended five-year sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines did
not seem appropriate in the case.
In these and other cases involving patient care, physicians may
intentionally or knowingly break the law because they believe it is in their
patient’s best interest to do so or because such action is consistent with their
professional norms. They perceive complying with the law as breaching their
duty to their patients as well as violating their autonomy and contravening their
judgment as to what is the right thing to do.102 Their behavior is consistent
with
[n]ormative theories of compliance with law [which] hold that people obey the
law because they believe it is right to do so. This sense of rightness may arise
because the behavior required by the law is consistent with the individual’s
own sense of right and wrong, or from a sense that the law is the product of a
103
“legitimate” or fair authority that is entitled to obedience.

96. Id.
97. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that physicians who
recommend the use of cannabis to patients as specified under California law are protected by the
First Amendment).
98. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding
that there is no medical necessity exception to the CSA’s prohibition against manufacturing and
distributing cannabis).
99. See Leff, supra note 92 (quoting Fry as saying, “What did I take an oath to do? To do no
harm and to alleviate pain and suffering . . . I’m going to be true to my oath, and I’m even willing
to go to prison for it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. Medical Marijuana: California Dr. Molly [sic] Fry Sentenced to Five Years, DRUG WAR
CHRON., Mar. 28, 2008, http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/529/molly_fry_sentenced_five_
years_medical_marijuana.
101. News Release, U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., California Doctor-Lawyer Couple Get
Five Years for Growing and Selling Marijuana (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/
states/newsrel/sanfran032008.html (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting the prosecution
argued that Fry and her husband sold the marijuana as a money making scheme rather than to
treat patients).
102. See Kent Greenawalt, Commentary, Legal Enforcement of Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 710, 718 (1995) (“The most serious breach of someone’s autonomy involves
coercion that contravenes that person’s own rational, reflective judgment.”).
103. Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior, 30
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 249 (2002) (citing T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990);
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In these cases, physicians are not complying with the law because they
disagree normatively with its requirements. Furthermore, they may distrust the
government’s judgments as to what is in their own interest as well as in their
patients’ best interest.104
Physician advocates might label these actions by physicians as “civil
disobedience.” The American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical
Ethics actually condones civil disobedience in some circumstances, stating:
Ethical values and legal principles are usually closely related, but ethical
obligations typically exceed legal duties. In some cases, the law mandates
unethical conduct. In general, when physicians believe a law is unjust, they
should work to change the law. In exceptional circumstances of unjust laws,
105
ethical responsibilities should supersede legal obligations.

While some physicians who break the law may engage in “true” civil
disobedience, technically, most physicians who break the law do so because
they perceive it as bad for their patients, and thus are not engaging in what is
more traditionally defined as civil disobedience. In an effort to distinguish
civil disobedience from other forms of lawbreaking, Childress constructed a
framework for moral analysis of illegal action.106 He contrasts features of
lawbreaking that are more or less morally justifiable.107 Acts, for example, that
are open and public, nonviolent, and justified by higher law or conscience, are
generally less morally culpable than those that are clandestine, evasive of law
enforcement, and violent.108 True civil disobedience, according to Childress, is
a nonviolent act publicly performed for the purpose of protesting a law or

Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority
Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 (2001)).
104. See Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 719 (“Exactly how much paternalism people will
countenance depends on how strongly they rate the value of autonomy and to what degree they
trust the judgments of the government as to what is in their self-interests.”).
105. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: THE RELATION OF LAW AND ETHICS Op.
1.02; see also Chalmers C. Clark, Letter to the Editor, Civil Disobedience: The Devil Is in the
Details, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July–Aug. 2005, at 4 (responding to Robert Macauley, The
Hippocratic Underground: Civil Disobedience and Health Care Reform, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 38) (“As a public trust, the medical profession has a lofty responsibility
to respect law, but respect for law does not imply slavishness. The higher duty of the profession,
according to its social contract, is to the priority of patient benefit. The medical profession is a
socially endowed moral autonomy . . . . [A]s public trust diminishes, professional autonomy
likewise declines. In service of the ongoing need for public persuasion, laws or policies that cut
against patient benefit must be strenuously resisted—through proper channels—yet indeed, as last
resort, the laws must be broken.”).
106. James F. Childress, Civil Disobedience, Conscientious Objection, and Evasive
Noncompliance: A Framework for the Analysis and Assessment of Illegal Actions in Health Care,
10 J. MED. & PHIL. 63, 65 (1985).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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government policy, where the wrongdoer is willing to undergo arrest and
prosecution.109
Childress distinguished civil disobedience from “conscientious objection”
and “evasive noncompliance.”110 Conscientious objection is a refusal to obey
based on personal moral beliefs rather than on a belief that the law should be
changed—a “moral-political” justification.111 Unlike civil disobedience,
evasive noncompliance is not done overtly or submissively; it is covert and
evasive.112 Physician lawbreaking may fall into any of these three categories
depending on its specific elements.
When physicians break law they view as harmful to their patients, the acts
are nonviolent but are generally not done openly as doing so would breach
patient confidentiality and privacy. In these cases, doctors are violating the
law primarily so that they can assist their patients or practice what they think is
good medicine. This may be both a matter of conscience and pragmatic.
Physicians no doubt disagree with the law they are violating and may think it
should be changed, but they may not be engaged in formal actions to change
the law. In some cases, physicians do not want to change the law but believe
that in a specific case, e.g., euthanasia, the law should not apply. In these
cases, Childress would categorize the physician’s actions as conscientious
objection.113 Most physicians, although not all, are not submissive to arrest
and punishment; nor are they typically evasive, i.e., they do not run from the
law and the illegal acts they perform may be done in the presence of other
health care providers. Some physicians may also underestimate the legal risk
associated with their actions. Under Childress’s typology of dissent,
physicians who break what they believe to be bad law but do not do so openly
or submissively, would be committing evasive noncompliance.114
True civil disobedience in health care does occur, although it is relatively
rare. For example, the actions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian would appear to meet the
traditional definition of civil disobedience. Kevorkian engaged in a nonviolent
act (assisting his patients terminate their lives),115 openly and, in at least one

109. See id. at 66; see also Matthew R. Hall, Guilty but Civilly Disobedient: Reconciling Civil
Disobedience and the Rule of Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2083 (2007) (proposing a doctrinal
definition of civil disobedience).
110. Childress, supra note106, at 67–69.
111. Id. at 68.
112. Id. at 68–69.
113. See id. at 68 (defining “conscientious objection” as “public, nonviolent, and submissive
violations of law based on personal-moral . . . convictions and intended primarily to witness to
those principles or values”).
114. See id. at 68–69 (defining “evasive noncompliance” as “illegal action [that] is both
covert and evasive”).
115. See Childress, supra note106, at 75 (defining “violence as intentional and unauthorized
harm or injury to a person against his/her will,” and noting that “mercy killing,” although an
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case, publicly, for the purpose of changing the law regarding physicianassisted suicide.116 Dr. Timothy Quill also, arguably, committed civil
disobedience when he published an article in the New England Journal of
Medicine admitting that he had assisted a patient end her life.117 In the area of
reproductive rights, Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a professor at Yale School of
Medicine, and Estelle Griswold, then executive director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut, engaged in civil disobedience when they
opened a birth control clinic in New Haven, Connecticut, intending to
challenge the validity of a Connecticut statute that banned prescribing of oral
contraceptives.118
In addition to violation of the laws regarding prescribing controlled
substances, i.e., opioids and marijuana, there are a number of cases where
physicians have broken or continue to break the law because they view it as
harmful to their patients. For example, prior to Roe v. Wade,119 there was
widespread violation of the laws prohibiting abortion.120 In 1955, Planned
Parenthood organized a conference on abortion in the United States where
conferees speculated that there could be between 200,000 and 1.2 million
abortions performed annually.121 Clearly, it was not an area where many
doctors were being prosecuted or feared prosecution.
In these cases, physicians felt compelled to perform “abortions for
pregnant women who might otherwise resort to dangerous, back-alley
procedures,” and also because they wanted to honor their patient’s self-

intentional act, does not qualify as a violent act unless “it intentionally inflicts a harm or injury on
a person against that person’s will”).
116. In a 1998 broadcast of 60 Minutes, Kevorkian permitted the airing of a videotape
showing him assisting Thomas Youk, a fifty-two year old male in the final stages of ALS, end his
life. 60 Minutes: Death by Doctor (CBS television broadcast Nov. 22, 1998), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4462047n%3fsource=search_video.
117. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision-Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991); see also Lawrence K. Altman, Doctor Says He Gave Patient Drug
to Help Her Commit Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A1 (discussing how Dr. Quill
“agonized” over the decision to help his patient when she asked him to assist her in ending her
life).
118. Ellen Chesler, Public Triumphs, Private Rights, MS. MAG., Summer 2005, available at
http://www.msmagazine.com/summer2005/birthcontrol.asp. Buxton and Griswold were arrested
for dispensing contraceptives to a married couple and convicted and fined $100 each. Id. They
appealed the conviction. Their case went to the Supreme Court, which determined that the
Connecticut law was unconstitutional. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
119. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120. See Childress, supra note 106, at 64 (“Birth control and abortion have perhaps been the
subjects of most illegal actions by both professionals and lay people over the last century or so [in
the area of health care].”).
121. JAMES RISEN & JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION
WAR 10–11 (1998).
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determination regarding her desire not to have a child.122 Arguably, it was the
“ideological and humanitarian impulses of [these] physicians pushing them
into law-breaking.”123 The law’s reaction to this lawbreaking was, for the most
part, not to prosecute physicians unless the practice came to public attention.124
Yet, many physicians were uncomfortable with the criminalization of the
procedure, and physicians as a group became involved in the effort to change
the law.125
An additional example where physicians may break the law because they
believe it is harmful to their patients is when laws and regulations mandate
aggressive treatment of severely disabled infants with life threatening
conditions even when the parents have requested termination or withholding of
such treatment. These laws include the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act126 (CAPTA) and its accompanying regulations (also known as the “Baby

122. See Michael L. Gross, Physician-Assisted Draft Evasion: Civil Disobedience, Medicine,
and War, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 444, 448 (2005). Abortions were often
performed by non-physicians, primarily “midwives and herbalists.” Jesilow et al., supra note 1,
at 156.
123. Jesilow et al., supra note 1, at 157. While many physicians had altruistic goals in
helping women who requested an abortion, it is also true that physicians were behind the early
efforts to criminalize it, in large part to prevent abortions by competitors, i.e., lay abortionists. Id.
at 156.
124. See Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774,
1789–90 (1991) (citing J. BATES & E. ZAWADZKI, CRIMINAL ABORTION 35–75 (1964)) (stating
that there were few abortion convictions because the effort required of law enforcement was not
justified in light of the ambivalent attitude toward the laws). The literature indicates that the few
prosecutions that were performed “targeted notorious or unusually large abortion “rings” or
“mills”; legitimate doctors were rarely prosecuted. Id. at 1790; see also Daniel G. Wyllie,
Comment, Abortion Reform in Michigan—An Analysis of the Proposed Code’s Provisions, 14
WAYNE L. REV. 1006 (1968).
125. Dr. Alan Guttmacher, an outspoken obstetrician for the legalization of abortion, sat in on
meetings of the American Law Institute (ALI), pushing them to write model legislation that
would decriminalize abortion. RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 121, at 11. Subsequently the AMA
endorsed the ALI plan (although it only allowed abortion to preserve the life or health of the
mother or in cases of rape, incest, or severe fetal abnormalities). Id.
126. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116i (2000 & Supp. IV 2007)). CAPTA provides
that as a condition of receipt of funds for child abuse prevention and treatment programs, states
must incorporate within their definition of medical neglect the failure to provide life sustaining
treatment to severely disabled newborns except in very limited circumstances. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B); see 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 app. (2007) (giving “interpretive guidelines” regarding
allowable exceptions to “medically indicated treatment” of disabled infants). Failure to
incorporate the definition means that states are denied federal funds for these programs. 42
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B). Where states have incorporated the federal definition of medical
neglect into their own definition, physicians could be prosecuted for failure to report the case to
child protective services, or for manslaughter or criminal negligence for failure to treat when they
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Doe Rules”), and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002127 (BAIPA).
In cases involving treatment of severely disabled newborns, physicians may
break the rules because (1) they believe it is not in the infant’s best interest to
continue treatment, but rather that it perpetuates the infant’s suffering, and (2)
because it deprives the child’s parents of the right to make treatment decisions
for the child. While physicians may violate the law by failing to treat these
infants, this is also an area where law enforcement agents do not seem to
prosecute physicians.128 Despite such lack of enforcement, there was
speculation a few years ago that physicians who failed to adequately treat
newborns might be new targets of prosecutors. In April 2005, DHHS
announced it would be investigating all circumstances where an individual or
entity was reported to be withholding medical care from an infant born alive in
potential violation of federal statutes (specifically, BAIPA).129 DHHS also
instructed state child protective service agencies that are responsible for
implementing regulations to enforce the 1984 Baby Doe Rules and to insist on
local execution of legal remedies to prevent non-treatment decisions deemed
impermissible by the Baby Doe Rules.130 Some argued that this directive
signaled an end to a period of benign regulatory neglect in this area,131 yet
cases of physicians arrested for violation of these laws have not surfaced.
In addition to physician-assisted suicide, distribution of contraceptives,
abortion, treatment of seriously disabled newborns, reporting of child abuse

know that such failure would lead to serious harm or to the death of the child. See id.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii).
127. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (codified
as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 8 (2006)). BAIPA provides that a viable infant that is born alive must
be treated as a person under the law. Id.
128. Irene Hurst, Letters to the Editor, First Rule: Choose Your Battles Wisely, 116
PEDIATRICS 288 (2005) (stating that “no state has prosecuted a single doctor, nurse, medical
institution, or family under these regulations”).
129. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LOG.
NO. ACYF-CB-PI-05-01, PROGRAM INSTRUCTIONS (2005); see Ceci Connolly, Doctors Are
Warned on Fetus Care: Guidelines Are Issued on Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, WASH.
POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at A7.
130. See Laura Hermer, The “Born-Alive Infants Protection Act” and Its Potential Impact on
Medical Care and Practice, HEALTH L. PERSP., Sept. 27, 2006, available at
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2006/(LH)BAIPA.pdf (“Because of the clear
connection the CAPTA memorandum makes between the failure to provide medical treatment
and state child abuse and neglect laws, it appears that physicians and hospitals may be subject to a
criminal charge of abuse and neglect should they withhold medical care from premature and/or
disabled infants.”).
131. See Sadath A. Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human Services
and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal
Practice, 116 PEDIATRICS e576, e577 (2005) (“[T]he current administration’s resurrection of
recently quiescent oversight of the treatment of imperiled newborns agitates the legal fault line
that physicians walk along when caring for these infants.”).
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and neglect, and dispensing of marijuana, physicians may also exercise “civil
disobedience” in order to protect patients or to act consistently with their
ethical norms by performing involuntary euthanasia, terminating treatment
when they deem it futile, or handing out clean needles to addicts to prevent the
spread of HIV. These issues raise profound questions about how the law
should react to violations of what the violators call “bad law” and how we
should assess such laws.
IV. RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO PHYSICIANS WHO VIOLATE LAWS
RELATING TO PATIENT CARE
The response of law enforcement to physicians who violate the law
because they claim it harms their patients ranges from seemingly conscious
disregard for the impact of their actions on patient care and the relevant
medical evidence, to wise inaction. In several cases involving patient care,
prosecutors, arguably, do not appropriately exercise their discretion and target
physicians who are providing a needed service to a population that finds it
difficult to obtain care. This appeared to be the case in the arrest and
prosecution of Dr. Frank Fisher.132 Fisher, who graduated from Harvard
Medical School, operated a clinic in northern California where he served a
large Medi-Cal133 population.134 He had a history of working with indigent
clients and in underserved communities, including on Native American
reservations.135 In California, approximately 5%–10% of his 3,000 patients
“suffered from severe, chronic intractable pain.”136 He was charged with five
counts of first degree murder stemming from his prescribing of opioids.137 At
least three of the murder charges appeared entirely bogus. “For example, one
of the patients for whom he prescribed opioids died as a passenger in an
automobile accident. Another death occurred when a non-patient stole and
overdosed on medications that Fisher had prescribed to a patient.”138 A third
patient actually died while Fisher was in jail and she was unable to obtain her
medications.139 The murder and drug diversion charges against Fisher were all
subsequently dismissed or dropped, but not until after he served five months in

132. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239–42 (discussing Fisher’s arrest, prosecution, and the
consequent effects on his practice of medicine).
133. In California, the Medicaid program is referred to as Medi-Cal. See Medi-Cal: Provider
Homepage, http://www.medi-cal.ca.gov/ (last visited May 19, 2009).
134. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
139. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 240.
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prison awaiting a preliminary hearing.140 The arrests and prosecutions of other
pain physicians have also left their patients without adequate pain treatment.
Once law enforcement agents decide to arrest a physician, their tactics may
also be unnecessarily dramatic and fear-inducing. Often physicians are
arrested in front of their patients. This has been the case for numerous
physicians arrested for prescribing opioids to their patients. In the case of
Fisher, for example, “over twenty armed law enforcement agents stormed into
Fisher’s clinic and arrested him.”141 Similarly, “more than a dozen federal
agents burst into [Dr. Cecil] Knox’s office with guns drawn while he was
seeing patients and arrested him. He was taken away in handcuffs and leg
irons.”142 Federal officials also “marched into Dr. Jeri Hassman’s office while
she was treating a patient, ‘took off her jewelry, put her in handcuffs and led
her to jail.’”143
In the case of physicians prescribing opioids for pain patients, law
enforcement agents may also pose as patients, attempting to trick the doctor
into inappropriately prescribing.
Prosecutors have also engaged in
questionable trial tactics. During the trial of Dr. William Hurwitz, six past
presidents of the American Pain Society sent a letter to Hurwitz’s lawyer citing
“‘misrepresentations’ by one of the Justice Department’s expert witnesses.”144
In the case of Dr. Robert Weitzel, a physician arrested for murder of four
severely ill elderly nursing home patients who allegedly died under his care
because he gave them opioid analgesics to manage their pain and dyspnea, the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence—testimony by a palliative care
expert that Weitzel did not engage in any criminal wrongdoing.145 The judge
referred to the prosecution’s behavior as “contraven[ing] manifest
constitutional, legal, and ethical duties.”146
Sentencing in these cases can also seem harsh. In fact, in some cases, the
judge appears constrained by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and would
have preferred a more compassionate response. In the prosecution of Dr.
Mollie Fry, for authorizing marijuana and growing marijuana for use by her
patients, herself, and her husband, the judge described the five-year minimum
sentence as a “‘tragedy’ that should ‘never have happened.’”147 Perhaps

140. Id.
141. Id. at 239.
142. Id. at 242 (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 250 (quoting Marc Kaufman, Worried Pain Doctors Decry Prosecutions, WASH.
POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A1).
144. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 248–49, 248 n.123.
145. See Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 235.
146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Fry and Shafer Released on Bail Pending Appeal, INDYBAY, Mar. 31, 2007,
http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2008/03/31/18489777.php (quoting U.S. District Court Judge
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because of the judge’s sympathy for Fry, he subsequently granted her release
on bail, stating that Fry (and her husband) had “substantial” grounds for appeal
that justified their release on bail, including “entrapment, the defendants’ state
of mind, and the conflict between state and federal laws.”148
In contrast to these cases, where the law enforcement response seems to
have ignored claims of patient well-being and been overly harsh, the legal
system has responded much more discriminately, even compassionately in a
number of cases where physicians appear to be acting to help their patients.
This seems to have been the response in the early abortion and contraceptive
cases, where law enforcement rarely prosecuted physicians or, if they did so,
only for the most blatant of violations. Similarly, it seems to characterize the
system’s current lack of aggressive enforcement of the Baby Doe Rules despite
the passage of the BAIPA and recent pronouncements of DHHS.
The latter, more tepid, response may be especially true when the law is in
flux or when there is considerable societal ambivalence about a law. This may
explain the legal system’s response to the cases of Dr. Jack Kevorkian and Dr.
Timothy Quill. Kevorkian assisted over 100 individuals end their lives.149
Between 1990 and 1999 he was arrested and prosecuted numerous times, all
unsuccessfully, until the case of Thomas Youk in 1999.150 In 1990 and 1992
Kevorkian was indicted for murder in the death of three individuals; however,
the cases were dismissed because Michigan had no law against assisting
suicide and he had “merely” helped the individuals end their own lives with his
“suicide machine.”151 After these unsuccessful prosecutions, the Michigan
legislature hurried to pass a fifteen-month ban on assisted suicide.152

Frank Damrell); see also New Book Exposes the First Federal Trial of a Medical Marijuana
Doctor, supra note 95 (discussing the circumstances leading to Fry’s arrest).
148. Fry and Shafer Released on Bail Pending Appeal, supra note 147.
149. Monica Davey, Kevorkian Freed After Years in Prison for Aiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 2007, at A8.
150. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming Kevorkian’s
conviction for second degree murder and delivery of controlled substances); see Frontline: The
Kevorkian
Verdict:
Chronology,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/kevorkian/
chronology.html (last visited May 20, 2009).
151. See People v. Kevorkian, Nos. CR-92-111590-FC, 92-DA-5303-AR, 1992 WL
12597834 (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 21, 1992) (finding that “physician assisted suicide was not a crime
in Michigan,” thus dismissing the charges of open murder brought against Kevorkian in 1992 for
assisting in the suicides of Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller); William E. Schmidt, Prosecutors
Drop Criminal Case Against Doctor Involved in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10
(noting that the Michigan district court dismissed murder charges brought against Kevorkian for
assisting Jane Adkins commit suicide in 1990 and “[d]eclar[ed] that the debate over euthanasia
and suicide must be sorted out by the state lawmakers rather than” the courts); see also Frontline:
The Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, supra note 150.
152. MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 752.1021–.1027 (LEXISNEXIS 2001); see also Frontline:
The Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, supra note 150 (noting passage of assisted suicide ban).
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Kevorkian violated the ban several times, but there was some uncertainty about
the ban’s constitutionality,153 and a jury found him not guilty of violating the
ban although he admitted to assisting a suicide during the fifteen-month period.
Subsequently, the state’s court of appeals found the ban unconstitutional for
“technical” reasons, but shortly thereafter the Michigan Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals decision.154 The supreme court also declared that
a statutory ban was not necessary to prosecute an individual for assisted
suicide; under the common law, assisted suicide could be prosecuted as a
felony with a five-year prison term.155 Despite this declaration, Michigan
juries on three occasions acquitted Kevorkian in subsequent prosecutions for
assisted suicide.156 During this period, many viewed Kevorkian as a hero,
helping the cause of physician-assisted dying.157 It was not until 1999 when
Kevorkian was tried for the first degree murder of Thomas Youk that he was
found guilty.158 The Youk case, however, was different from the prior cases in
that Youk, who had Lou Gehrig’s disease, was unable to trigger his own death,
and Kevorkian directly injected him with a lethal drug.159 The act was also
televised on 60 Minutes.160 The jury ultimately found Kevorkian guilty of
153. A judge in Wayne County determined the law to be unconstitutional, but an Oakland
County prosecutor said the ruling was not binding in his jurisdiction. Suicide Law Struck Down,
but Kevorkian Stays Jailed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at A18; see generally Hobbins v. Att’y
Gen., 518 N.W.2d 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing procedural histories of appeals that it
consolidated from the Wayne and Oakland circuit courts regarding the constitutionality of the
assisted suicide ban), rev’d People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
154. Hobbins, 518 N.W.2d at 491 (holding the legislation criminalizing assisted suicide
constitutionally infirm because it contained “two distinct objects”), rev’d, Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d
714.
155. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 739 (“[E]ven absent a statute that specifically proscribes
assisted suicide, prosecution and punishment for assisting in a suicide would not be precluded.
Rather, such conduct may be prosecuted as a separate common-law offense . . . .”).
156. See Frontline: The Kevorkian Verdict: Chronology, supra note 150 (noting the three
instances in which Michigan juries acquitted Kevorkian on charges brought against him under the
state’s assisted suicide ban, including May 2, 1994 for the death of Thomas Hyde; March 8, 1996
for two separate deaths; and April 1, 1996 for the deaths of Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller);
Newshour: CBS’ Assisted Suicide Decision (PBS television broadcast Nov. 24, 1998), transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec98/suicide_11-24.html (referencing
interview between CBS’s Mike Wallace and Jack Kevorkian); see e.g., David Margolick, Jury
Acquits Dr. Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at A20 (discussing
Michigan’s assisted suicide ban in light of Kevorkian’s acquittal of charges brought against him
for assisting Thomas Hyde commit suicide).
157. See Michael Betzold, The Selling of Doctor Death: How Jack Kevorkian Became a
National Hero, NEW REPUBLIC, May 26, 1997, at 22.
158. See People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 296 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
159. See id.
160. See 60 Minutes: Death by Doctor, supra note 116; see also Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d at
296 (noting that the videotapes of Kevorkian administering lethal drugs to Youk, which were
aired on 60 Minutes, were shown to the jury during trial).
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second degree murder and the judge sentenced him to ten to twenty-five years
in prison.161 In her sentencing statement, Judge Jessica Cooper was
undoubtedly influenced by Kevorkian’s blatant disregard for the law stating:
“[Y]ou had the audacity to go on national television, show the world what you
did and dare the legal system to stop you. Well, sir, consider yourself
stopped.”162
The response of the criminal justice system to the public disclosure by Dr.
Timothy Quill that he had assisted one of his patients who suffered from
leukemia end her life, was clearly one of compassion.163 In an article in the
New England Journal of Medicine,164 Quill stated that he prescribed the
patient, a forty-five-year old woman, “with enough barbiturates . . . to commit
suicide when and if the time came . . . . [He] made sure that she knew how to
use the barbiturates for sleep, and also that she knew the amount needed to
commit suicide.”165 The prosecutor brought the case before a grand jury,
seeking a criminal indictment. The grand jury, clearly sympathetic to the
plight of the patient, declined to indict Quill on criminal charges.166
As demonstrated by these cases and others, there are a number of ways in
which the criminal justice system may respond to physician lawbreaking when
society is strongly divided about the correctness of the law. Prosecutors may
give low priority to enforcement, or, as in the case of Quill, a grand jury may
decline to issue an indictment.167 If the case goes to court, juries are often
sympathetic to physicians when they are performing what is perceived as a
merciful act. In many cases, such as those of Kevorkian, where a physician
has been prosecuted for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia, he or she has
been acquitted.168 In some cases, this may be a result of jury nullification.
When a physician is found guilty, judges may have some discretion in how
they sentence physicians accused of these kinds of crimes and may be more

161. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d at 296.
162. Statement from Judge to Kevorkian, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at A23.
163. See supra text accompanying note 117.
164. Quill, supra note 117.
165. Id. at 693; see also Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who Said He
Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at A1 (discussing Quill’s indictment by a grand
jury for charges brought against him related to his role in his patient’s suicide).
166. See Altman, supra note 165.
167. See also Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 235–36 (discussing Louisiana v. Pou, in which the
Louisiana Attorney General was unable to obtain a grand jury indictment against Dr. Anna Pou,
who allegedly euthanized four patients who could not be evacuated from a health care facility
after Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans).
168. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Letting the Public Decide About Assisted Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1997, at E4 (describing the acquittal of Dr. Ernesto Pinzon-Reyes on charges of
“hastening the death of a terminally ill cancer patient”); Ronald J. Hansen, Kevorkian Released
from Prison After 8 Years, DETROIT NEWS, June 2, 2007, at 1 (noting that Kevorkian had been
acquitted in several cases of assisted suicide, until he represented himself in court).
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lenient when societal views about the issue are strongly divided. The various
points in the process offer a set of safety valves to put the brakes on a system
that might otherwise be too quick to lump all accused in the same category.
Prosecutor reluctance to enforce or charge and jury reluctance to convict
may stem from two problems with the relevant laws: the lack of a consensus as
to their moral validity and to their medical justification. Often, these laws have
a moral basis and there is not agreement among the profession or across
society as to whether the prohibited actions are wrong as a normative matter.
While some legal enforcement of morality may be uncontroversial—when the
law requires some to refrain from acts that “others” think are immoral, but the
target of the law does not—compliance may be limited.169 This may be
especially true when the moral judgments are religiously based.170
Additionally, these laws are medically questionable. There is often
disagreement within the profession as to what is medically appropriate in some
of these cases, e.g., physicians may not agree on what is the appropriate dosage
of opioids to prescribe to a chronic pain patient; what treatment is in the best
interest of a severely impaired and premature newborn; when medical care is
truly futile; or whether physician-assisted suicide is justified. Different views
within the profession prevent establishment of a unified standard of care and
make arguments to harshly treat these physicians more difficult.171
V. OBSERVATIONS, SUGGESTIONS, AND CONCLUSION
The ways in which physicians respond to the law affirm David Mechanic’s
observation that medicine has its share of angels and scoundrels; yet it is not
always clear in which group they belong. For those physicians who break the
law, the reasons for their actions will no doubt affect our assessment. When
greed is the motivation, we want to condemn physicians for their actions and
punish them harshly. In the case of violation of the fraud laws, these doctors
appear to view themselves as “above the law” and, as Professor Johnson
suggests, to push the boundaries of safe harbors.172 These physicians may also
lack the sensitivity to either the legal or extra-legal sanctions that accompany
lawbreaking and do not see breaking these laws as being in conflict with their
professional identity. They often view the laws as unfair and feel their actions
are justified in order to receive “appropriate” compensation for their work.

169. See Greenawalt, supra note 102, at 710 (“[M]uch legal enforcement of morality is
uncontroversial and rarely discussed.”).
170. Id.
171. See Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 233 (finding that “divergent views of the standard of
care” were a feature of the five cases they reviewed in which physicians were criminally
prosecuted in conjunction with palliative or end of life care).
172. Johnson, supra note 2, at 1019 (“There is some sense that doctors are willing to push the
envelope on the financial side . . . and are less willing to do that . . . in their clinical decisions.”).
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Yet, there are other physicians for whom greed is not the basis of their
violation of the fraud laws. In some cases, they believe the insurance rules are
harmful to their patients, in others, their violation of the law is not intentional;
it is due to negligence and ignorance of the law. Similarly, when physicians
violate the CSA because they are prescribing opioids for chronic pain patients,
in some cases the motivation may be greed, but often it is because they are
trying to treat their patients’ pain. In the latter case, they may not know they
are breaking the law or they may disagree with the law, believing that their
prescribing is appropriate. In many of these cases, as well as some fraud cases,
the government response appears overly zealous and lacks judicious discretion.
However, in cases where the motivation for the physician’s action is clearly
not greed but is patient care, the legal response varies from wise inaction to
disregard of relevant medical evidence.
In this section, based on the reasons that physicians appear to violate both
the fraud laws and laws regarding patient care, as well as observations about
how our law enforcement system reacts to this physician behavior, I make a
series of suggestions. These suggestions are geared toward improving
physician compliance with the law and improving the quality of patient care.
A.

Need for Law Enforcement to Consider Impact on Patients

In exercising its discretion to pursue physicians for alleged wrongdoing,
law enforcement appears to ignore the impact of its actions on patient care.
Failure to take this factor into account is misguided. The impact assessment
should begin with some consideration of the trauma caused to patients by law
enforcement personnel who barge into physicians’ offices to arrest them while
they are seeing patients, with guns drawn, and in SWAT team attire.173 Such
dramatic and strong-arm tactics seem wholly unnecessary and are likely
harmful to the innocent patients who are forced to witness them.
Moreover, law enforcement should consider how arrest and prosecution of
physicians may affect patient access to health care. Doctors who are arrested
and prosecuted for fraud or inappropriate prescribing not only face possible jail
time and fines but are also likely to lose their licenses, staff privileges, or both.
Effectively, they are lost from the numbers of physicians available to treat
patients. The little data that is available seems to indicate that often the
physicians who are targeted for arrest by prosecutors for fraud are working in

173. See, e.g., Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 242 (discussing the arrest of Dr. Cecil Knox based
on various charges related to his prescribing of narcotics) (citing Maia Szalavitz, Dr. Feelscared:
Drug Warriors Put the Fear of Prosecution in Physicians Who Dare to Treat Pain, REASON,
Aug. 2004, at 32); see also supra text accompanying notes 142–43.
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underserved areas or with underserved populations.174 Taking these physicians
out of circulation may mean that their patients lack access to a licensed
physician, except in a medical emergency.
These arrests and prosecutions may also have a chilling effect on the
behavior of other physicians.175 A national survey of 331 doctors conducted
by the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (AAPS) in July
1999, regarding the impact of Medicare regulations and the increased
government crackdown on fraudulent billing, revealed that “[i]ncreased fear of
prosecution or government retaliation has had a negative impact on patients’
access to doctors and their ability to receive certain services such as
surgery.”176 Over 80% reported “increased fear of prosecution or investigation
in the prior three years”; 71% “reported making changes in their practice to
avoid the threat of prosecution, including greatly restricting services.”177 More
than one-third (34%) of all physician respondents had restricted services, such
as surgery, to Medicare patients.178 Almost one-fourth (23%) said they were
not accepting new Medicare patients, and reported that the desire to avoid
unpleasant or even threatening encounters with Medicare was a reason for this
change in practice pattern.179 Respondents also complained that compliance
with Medicare regulations took a significant amount of their time away from
patient care.180
In addition, the arrest and prosecution of physicians for prescribing opioids
has had far-reaching impacts on the treatment of chronic pain patients. Due to
the limited number of physicians willing to treat this patient population, these
prosecutions have made it more difficult, in some cases impossible, for chronic
pain patients to find physicians who will treat them.181
B.

Complexity/Legitimacy of Laws

The fact that such a large number of physicians are being arrested and
prosecuted for fraud and prescription drug violations raises the possibility of

174. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, An Economic Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims
Act Cases on Access to Healthcare for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and Inner-City Poor, 27 AM.
J.L. &. MED. 439, 462–66 (2001).
175. See generally id. (discussing the “chilling effect” in terms of physician behavior that
results from the uncertainty or inability to predict which behavior will lead to false certification
prosecutions).
176. See Press Release, Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Doctors’ Study: Medicare
“Fraud” Crackdown Hurts Patients (Feb. 4, 2000), available at http://aapsonline.org/press/
medspr.htm.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. See Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 235.
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overreaching on the part of prosecutors, and should raise red-flags for those of
us concerned about the legitimacy of the rules and their enforcement, as well
as their impact on patient care and the health care system.
Physicians who violate the fraud laws, in some cases, may have been
motivated by their moral evaluation of the act, i.e., they may not have viewed
their behavior as wrong or they may have viewed the law as unfair. The
literature lends support to this interpretation of the behavior of physicians who
intentionally break the fraud laws.182 Both physicians and medical students
were more likely to blame the Medicare and Medicaid billing rules for
physician arrests and prosecutions than the actions of the physicians.183
The literature on white-collar crime acknowledges that one’s moral beliefs,
independent of considerations of costs and benefits, can constrain illegal
behavior.184 But, perhaps equally likely, moral beliefs may lead to illegal
behavior if the law is deemed to be unfair or unjust. In those circumstances,
the response of the criminal justice system is typically to increase sanctions in
order to ensure compliance. Over the last decade in fact, the sanctions for
violation of the fraud laws have been significantly increased.185 Another route,
however, could be to either persuade physicians that the Medicare and
Medicaid billing procedures are fair or to change them so that they are fairer.
Physician reaction to the fraud laws stems largely from the complexity of
the billing rules for Medicare and Medicaid. Thus, this may be a starting point
for reform. In Japan, the perceived unfairness of the medical insurance
reimbursement system led to widespread fraud but the government,
understanding the flaws of the system, elected not to aggressively prosecute
physicians who violated the rules.186 In the United States, we have a
reimbursement system that is perceived as unfair yet it is aggressively
enforced. The two in combination seem especially misguided and suggest the
need to simplify or rework the Medicare and Medicaid rules for billing and
fraud control and, or at least until that occurs, adopt a less aggressive
enforcement policy.
Physician complaints about laws stem from concerns not only about the
fairness of the laws but also about the fairness of their enforcement. In the

182. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality:
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 579 (1996)
(finding that white-collar criminals use a utilitarian calculation when deciding to break the law
but include in that calculation their moral assessment of the law).
183. See Keenan et al., supra note 37, at 170–71.
184. Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 182, at 554.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 50–56.
186. See Ames Gross & Gayatri B. Koolwal, Patient Disclosure Rights in Japan’s Healthcare
System, PAC. BRIDGE MED., Mar. 1998, http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/
japan/1998_patient_disclosure_rights_in_japans.htm (noting that the “Japanese are loathe to use
[legal] means” to improve the quality of patient care).
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fraud area, there are numerous anecdotes about physicians who have been
criminally prosecuted for relatively minor infractions, i.e., less than a few
hundred dollars of overbilling.187 In some cases, the sanctions also seem
largely incommensurate with the violation. Moreover, at least early in the
program’s history, numerous financial incentives existed for law enforcement
agents to arrest and prosecute physicians for fraud violations.188 These
allegations and facts contribute to a perception that the entire fraud
enforcement system is unfair and threatens the overall legitimacy of the fraud
control effort. Professor William Sage has observed that the focus of the fraud
laws on protecting the financial integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid
systems rather than patient welfare “tends to breed cynicism among physicians
and brings fraud enforcement into conflict with sound health policy.”189
Others have warned that more aggressive law enforcement initiatives “could
threaten the long-term political support that is essential to sustaining [fraud
control] efforts and might upset the balance between effective fraud control
and the burden of compliance.”190
C. Turning Negligence into Crime
An additional observation that surfaces after reviewing the cases in which
physicians “break the law” is the broad reach of the law to include
unintentional violations. There is general agreement that someone who
intentionally or knowingly breaks a good law should be prosecuted and
punished. However, when the violation of the law is unknowing or
unintentional,191 criminal sanctions may not be appropriate as applied to

187. See LIBBY, supra note 53, at 32. For example, Libby notes that “[d]uring Richard
Kusserow’s tenure as [Inspector General of DHHS] from 1981 to 1992, he inaugurated a veritable
reign of terror against physicians and other providers. [He] encouraged trivial and malicious
prosecutions of doctors for alleged fraud of less than a hundred dollars.” Id. Libby also provides
examples of similarly aggressive prosecutions by state Medicaid Fraud Control Units (FCU). He
cites the Hawaii FCU, under the direction of George Yamamoto, which “prosecuted an optician
who was convicted of a criminal felony for overbilling Medicaid by $7.75.” Id. at 34.
188. Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 246 (2004) (describing funding and incentives in fraud control).
189. William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse Law, 282 JAMA 1179, 1180 (1999). Sage refers to
“burdensome coding requirements for evaluation and management [that] continue the unfortunate
transformation of the medical record from a clinical management tool into a defensive
document.” Id.
190. ROBERT BERENSON ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY INST., COST CONTAINMENT IN
MEDICARE: A REVIEW OF WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN’T 61 (2008), available at
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2008_18_medicare.pdf.
191. The Model Penal Code includes intentional, knowing, reckless, and negligent as mental
states that may be sufficient to establish criminal intent. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)–(d)
(1962).
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physicians, despite the fact that the law may allow for it. In these cases, the
law may be overly broad, permitting criminal prosecution for negligence.
As regards the fraud laws, it is difficult to know whether physicians
intentionally or knowingly violate the law, but it appears that in some cases
physicians are being arrested, prosecuted, and threatened with criminal
sanctions for technical, or regulatory, violations. Given the multitude and
complexity of rules governing Medicare and Medicaid billing, it is possible
that in some cases physicians are not intentionally violating the law but are
making mistakes in their billing practices. Again, prosecutions for such
actions raise concerns about fairness and legitimacy. Rosenzweig argues that
as we expand what constitutes criminal wrongs “to include trivial matters more
suitably treated as civil wrongs, those who act in good faith yet get caught by
the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority perceive themselves as victims
of an over-zealous regulatory state that trivializes crime . . . and erodes its
moral footing.”192 Certainly, an argument can be made that such violations
should not be subject to criminal prosecution at all, but if they are, sanctions
for those who unintentionally commit these technical violations should be less
severe than for those where intentionality is clear.193
In addition to the arrests and prosecutions of physicians for fraud, scores of
physicians are being arrested and prosecuted for drug abuse and diversion
based on a standard that is “uncomfortably close” to a civil malpractice
standard.194 The standard has led to the conviction of numerous physicians
who were prescribing large volumes of scheduled drugs, e.g., opioids, and
treating a large number of chronic pain patients. In many of these cases, there
was no evidence that the physicians benefited financially from their
prescribing (other than for the office visit). Moreover, “experts disputed the
‘reasonableness’ of the physician’s prescribing practices; and . . . the
physician’s patients often included drug addicts who lied to the physician to
obtain their drugs.”195
In addition, under the CSA, while the statutory language for criminal
liability requires that a physician knowingly violate the law,196 the courts have
eroded that requirement in a way that is arguably harmful to patients. As in the
cases of fraud, “[b]ecause determining what the physician actually knew or
intended is difficult, ‘courts have held that a deliberate course of conduct
whereby the defendant avoids the requisite guilty knowledge may be held

192. Rosenzweig Testimony, supra note 62, at 145.
193. See id. at 152–53.
194. Under the CSA, a physician is guilty of criminal conduct if he or she prescribes without
a “legitimate medical purpose” and outside “the usual course of his professional practice.” 21
C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2008); see supra text accompanying notes 76–82.
195. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 239.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 76–82.
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tantamount to guilty knowledge per se.’”197 In these cases, the trial court often
issues to the jury a “‘conscious avoidance’ charge, also known as a ‘willful
blindness’ instruction”198 or an “ostrich instruction, because the defendant is
considered by the court to have, figuratively, stuck his head in the sand to
avoid learning truths that would otherwise have been patently obvious to the
average reasonable person.”199
For the more common cases of illegal drug distribution, the instructions
have been used where the defendant is accused of transporting drugs in a
suitcase or handbag and claims not to have been aware that the bag contained
the drugs. The instructions, however, have been borrowed from that setting
and applied in cases against physicians who prescribed drugs to patients who
subsequently diverted them. In these cases, the prosecution argues that the
physician “deliberately ignored facts that would have led [a reasonable
physician] to believe the patient was diverting the drugs.”200
A willful blindness instruction is inappropriate in this context as it
undermines the doctor-patient relationship. I have argued elsewhere that:
[d]octors . . . must develop a trusting relationship with their patients, which
requires them to listen to their patients and believe their accounts of their
symptoms . . . . [T]his is especially true in the field of pain management where
there is no objective test for pain. Neither is there a wholly accurate test to
determine whether the patient is telling the truth or fabricating his symptoms.
Physicians who ignore their patient’s pain accounts would be arguably
negligent. Prosecutors and the DEA argue that “doctors violate the law when
they prescribe pain pills to patients who they know—or reasonably should
know—are selling or abusing the drugs.” But, this puts physicians in the
position of being watch dogs for law enforcement or, at least, suspicious of
201
their patients’ claims of pain.

Deborah Hellman, in an article that focuses on the use of the willful
blindness instruction in these cases and whether the physician’s professional

197. Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 276 (quoting Deborah Sprenger, Annotation, Propriety of
Instruction of Jury on “Conscious Avoidance” of Knowledge of Nature of Substance or
Transaction in Prosecution for Possession or Distribution of Drugs, 109 A.L.R. FED. 710, 713, §
2[a] (1992)).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 276 n.340 (quoting Sprenger, supra note 197, at 710, 713, § 2[a]) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 276–77.
201. Id. at 303 (footnotes omitted). Dr. William Hurwitz, a pain doctor who was criminally
prosecuted under this standard, has written that the standard “forces doctors who try to treat pain
to act like police, reinforcing a perverse medical paternalism that subverts the ethical imperatives
designed to protect patient autonomy and dignity. This distortion of the patient-physician
relationship stigmatizes patients and erodes their trust.” Id. at 304 (quoting William E. Hurwitz,
Pain Control in the Police State of Medicine (Part II), 8 J. AM. PHYS. & SURGEONS 13, 14
(2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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obligations should provide a defense to the charges at issue, argues both that
“[p]rosecuting doctors for being willfully blind to a patient’s wrongful
reselling of drugs criminalizes physicians’ trust in their patients” and that
“doctors treating patients in pain act rightly in trusting their patients, and thus
the law erroneously imposes criminal sanctions on actions that are morally
justified.”202
The expansion of the white-collar criminal law and drug control laws to
include unintentional violations may also have led to recent criminal
prosecutions of physicians for medical negligence.
There are no
comprehensive data on the number of cases in which physicians have been
prosecuted for criminal negligence, but, while the numbers are quite small,203
they appear to be growing.
In 1990, the AMA commented that the “prosecution of physicians for
clinical mistakes was ‘almost unknown.’”204 However, a series of criminal
prosecutions of physicians in the late 1980s and early 1990s prompted the
AMA to adopt a resolution “to insure that medical decision-making exercised
in good faith, does not become a violation of criminal law.”205 In 1995, the
AMA adopted a more formal statement on the subject condemning the “current
trend” of the criminalization of medical malpractice.206 At the time of that
statement, “the AMA estimated [that] only about [ten] physicians nationwide
had been prosecuted for medical negligence” but feared increased prosecutions
in this area.207 Two articles published in 2001 and one article published in
2007 describe cases where physicians were prosecuted for medical negligence
in the recent past. Filkins identified nine cases between 1981 and 1995;208
Liederbach et al. identified fifteen cases between 1986 and 1999,209 and Kollas
et al. reviewed five criminal prosecutions against physicians occurring between
1992 and 2005 involving palliative or end of life care.210

202. Deborah Hellman, Prosecuting Doctors for Trusting Patients, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
701, 702 (2009).
203. See James A. Filkins, “With No Evil Intent”: The Criminal Prosecution of Physicians for
Medical Negligence, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 471–72 (2001) (noting that there are only fifteen
reported appellate decisions of such prosecutions between 1809 and 1981).
204. Id. at 469–70 (quoting Pennsylvania Prosecutor Finds No Grounds for Charges Against
Surgeon, AM. MED. NEWS, June 1, 1990, at 5).
205. Id. at 470 (quoting Morton M. Kurtz, Criminalization of Medical Judgment, Resolution
223, PROC. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERIM MEETING (1993)).
206. Id. (quoting Criminalization of Health Care Decision-Making, Resolution 202, PROC.
AM. MED. ASS’N, INTERIM MEETING (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 164 (citing AMA Policy H-160.946).
207. Filkins, supra note 203, at 470.
208. Id. at 471–90. The cases actually include prosecutions of eight physicians and one
corporation for medical negligence. Id. at 471.
209. Liederbach et al., supra note 3, at 150–56.
210. Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 234–36.
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Research on these cases indicates that a common element is disagreement
about the relevant standard of care. Filkins observed that these cases are often
inappropriately addressed in the criminal justice system as prosecutors fail to
establish that the physician breached a standard of care or that the physician’s
actions caused the patient’s harm.211 Rather, the physician’s state of mind acts
as a substitute for careful scrutiny of the physician’s actions and their impact
on the patient’s injury.212 He argues that “[a] defendant physician’s state of
mind should be weighed only after the issues of causation and standard of care
have been resolved and all the facts considered. To do otherwise exposes
physicians ‘to potential criminal liability for their actions related purely to their
exercise of professional clinical judgment.’”213 Kollas et al. similarly
concluded that establishing a violation of the standard of care was a weak link
in the prosecution of a number of physicians who were charged with homicide
for the death of patients who were terminally ill.214
The justification for use of the criminal laws has traditionally included
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. When physicians are prosecuted for
negligent acts, it is unlikely that such actions will have a deterrent effect.
Deterrence is grounded in rational choice theory, which assumes actors weigh
the costs and benefits of their acts. When their acts are not intentional, such a
model has less explanatory value.215 Alternatively, efforts to prosecute
physicians for negligent acts may have an “anti-deterrent” effect. Liederbach
et al. speculate that “when prosecutions occur, they will trigger an
‘oppositional culture’ among doctors, in which physicians band together to
define such intervention as illegitimate and characterize the doctors to which
they are applied as scapegoats of politically ambitious prosecutors.”216 If this
is so, they conclude that “such resistance to control might create ‘defiance’ and
produce effects that undermine deterrence.”217
The goal of rehabilitation is also unlikely to be met through criminal
sanctions for negligent behavior. Arguably, these physicians could benefit
from mentoring or retraining, but they will not be subject to these forms of

211. Filkins, supra note 203, at 498.
212. Id. at 498.
213. Id. at 498–99 (quoting State v. Naramore, 965 P.2d 211, 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)
(Brazil, C.J., dissenting)).
214. Kollas et al., supra note 8, at 237–38.
215. See Liederbach, supra note 3, at 166 (“[T]he extent to which white-collar offenders are
deterrable by legal sanctions remains uncertain. This issue is likely to be complicated still further
in the case of doctors, where the behavior targeted for deterrence is perhaps not intended nor due
to rational calculation . . . .” (citation omitted)).
216. Id.
217. Id. But Liederbach et al. also hypothesize that such prosecutions could have a deterrent
effect by creating stronger incentives for doctors to police their peers and adopt practices that
reduce medical errors and improve patient safety. Id. at 167.
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rehabilitation through the criminal justice system.218 These educational
approaches, however, could be imposed by state medical boards, if they were
to become more active in disciplining these types of cases.
This leaves retribution as the primary objective for prosecution of
physicians for gross medical malpractice. This justification for criminalization
is least applicable when intent is absent.
D. Need for Law Enforcement Self-Assessment Regarding Impact
It also becomes clear, from reviewing physician lawbreaking and the law
enforcement response, that there is a failure on the part of law enforcement to
adequately evaluate its own effectiveness. For example, regarding the fraud
laws and their enforcement, while there appear to be some indications that the
increased expenditure on fraud control has had a deterrent effect, the impact of
that effect is unknown.219 Moreover, there appear to be few efforts to
determine whether the costs associated with the system are commensurate with
the benefit. Efforts to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the laws and their
enforcement seem to focus most often on return on investment, i.e., the number
of government dollars spent on enforcement and the dollars recovered from
fines and sanctions, rather than an effort to look at the full costs and benefits of
the program to society.220 The latter, for example, would include the cost to
physicians of compliance with the complex billing rules,221 the costs of false
positives (i.e., those physicians who are inappropriately captured, prosecuted,
and sanctioned), the costs to patients who are unable to find a physician to treat
them or who are denied care, as well as any benefits that may result from
reductions in unnecessary treatment.222 In addition, there does not appear to be

218. See generally Russell E. Farbiarz, Victim-Offender Mediation: A New Way of
Disciplining America’s Doctors, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 359, 362 (2008) (noting that
rehabilitation was “abandoned as the primary goal [of the criminal justice system] in the 1970’s
and 1980’s” but that it could be reintroduced to physicians through victim-offender mediation).
219. See BERENSON ET AL., supra note 190, at 60.
220. See, e.g., id. at 61.
221. Sage has observed that “fraud compliance has become a full-time job for providers as
well as enforcers, raising the risk of symbiotic bureaucracies that waste rather than preserve
resources.” Sage, supra note 189, at 1180.
222. An academic study by Becker et al., for example,
analyzed the impact of increased support for fraud enforcement activities on the costs and
quality of care provided to Medicare patients . . . . The authors concluded that increased
fraud enforcement resources result in greater declines in expenditures . . . without
evidence of an increase in adverse health outcomes. There were, however, significant
differences in the effects of increased enforcement across different types of patients (e.g.,
age, gender, and race) and hospitals (e.g., ownership type, size, and location).
BERENSON ET AL., supra note 190, at 60 (citing David Becker et al., Detecting Medicare Abuse,
24 J. HEALTH ECON. 189, 189–210 (2005)).
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consideration of the potential benefit of alternatives to aggressive enforcement
of the fraud laws.
There is some acknowledgement in the literature that the fraud laws were
initially quite effective at reducing large scale fraud and blatant violations of
the law such as “Medicaid mills” where physicians billed for services not
rendered.223 Today, the law enforcement efforts related to these laws seem
more targeted at uncovering fraud in mainstream medical practice where the
wrongdoing is often based on technical violations of the law and is very costly
to discover and prosecute.224 While enforcement efforts are assisted by
whistleblowers, they still require painstaking record review and attention to
minute billing details.225 These more recent efforts may have diminishing
returns, especially when the violations are associated with technical oversights.
Moreover, a recent report by AARP, based on interviews with several former
government officials, found that “efforts to enlist beneficiaries[] [as
whistleblowers to] help in identifying fraud have not been successful” due to
the complexity of the Medicare billing rules and the “difficulty of
distinguishing innocent billing errors from intentional fraud.”226
Finally, policy makers should consider the effectiveness of the fraud
control laws and their enforcement in comparison to alternative approaches to
combating fraud.
Hyman argues, for example, “that Medicare has
underinvested in prepayment claims review and has compensated for this by
imposing very severe sanctions on fraudulent claims through the [False Claims
Act] and other legal tools.”227 Similarly, in the area of prosecution of
physicians for prescribing of opioids, the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) does not appear to have evaluated whether its efforts
have reduced drug diversion and abuse and/or how those efforts have affected
patient access to care.
Failure to assess their practices appears to be quite common among law
enforcement entities. In his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on
Crime and Drugs in 2002, Rosenzweig pointed out that
there is virtually no data on whether or not criminal enforcement programs
actually have a deterrent effect, much less assessments of the quantum of that
effect. Instead, agencies prosecuting white-collar crime routinely report only

223. See Paul E. Kalb, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, 282 JAMA 1163, 1163 (1999).
224. See id.
225. See LIBBY, supra note 53, at 24 (“The government has broadened its definition of health
fraud at a time that most ‘big time’ fraud in health care has been eliminated. Prosecutors are now
increasingly forced to concentrate upon nit-picking technical interpretations of regulations to
convict solo practitioners.”).
226. BERENSON ET AL., supra note 190, at 60.
227. Id. at 60–61 (citing David A. Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud: An Empirical
Perspective, 22 CATO J. 151 (2002)).
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the number of cases they have brought, without any attempt to determine the
228
effectiveness of their activity.

Nor do they appear to assess the costs of their activities beyond government
expenditures.
These comments highlight a major difference between medical practice
and law enforcement practice. While quality improvement has become an
integral part of health care systems, the concept seems to be foreign to law
enforcement. Law enforcement agencies do not appear to make efforts to
assess the impact of their practices or whether they are achieving their ultimate
goals and at what cost.
E.

Need for System of Expert Advice to Law Enforcement

Many of the cases where law enforcement has “overreached” might have
been avoided by prosecutors and law enforcement agents if they had consulted
or collaborated with medical experts to determine whether the physician who
was the target of their investigation was a threat to the public by virtue of their
medical practice. This is especially true in the context of physicians arrested
for the prescribing of opioids or for gross negligence. Such medical expertise
could come from state medical boards. Arguably, there needs to be better
collaboration between state medical boards and prosecutors. In a study of
cases where physicians were prosecuted for drug diversion, Reidenberg and
Willis found that in the large majority, state medical boards had not been
consulted at all prior to the physician’s criminal indictment.229
In a number of other countries, e.g., Japan, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia,
and India, physicians are prosecuted for medical acts largely because of the
“lack of alternative forms of redress,” such as disciplinary actions by medical
boards.230 Given the existence of these entities in the United States, however,
it seems inappropriate to jump to the criminal justice system to address cases
related to standards of patient care. State medical boards are certainly better
equipped to evaluate acceptable medical practice and the threat of a
physician’s practices to public welfare than are federal and state prosecutors.231
Admittedly, state medical boards are often underfunded and understaffed and

228. Rosenzweig Testimony, supra note 62, at 155.
229. M.M. Reidenberg & O. Willis, Prosecution of Physicians for Prescribing Opioids to
Patients, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 903, 905 (2007).
230. Edward Monico et al., The Criminal Prosecution of Medical Negligence, 5 INTERNET
J.L., HEALTHCARE & ETHICS 1 (2007), http://www.ispub.com/ostia/index.php?xmlFilePath=
journals/ijlhe/vol5n1/criminal.xml.
231. See Hoffmann, supra note 4, at 307 (arguing in the context of prosecution for drug
diversion that medical boards are “better equipped to determine whether the volume and dosages
of opioids prescribed for a patient are consistent with acceptable medical practice than are federal
and state prosecutors”).
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cannot devote the resources necessary to adequately police all cases of
physician wrongdoing. But, there is no reason why federal law enforcement
agents should not consult with state medical boards regarding the need for
disciplinary action in a given case, especially before criminal prosecution. In
addition, greater resources could be devoted to state medical boards, perhaps
by reallocating resources currently being devoted to federal and state criminal
enforcement of medical wrongdoing. Such a shift may both reduce the need
for criminal action and improve the quality of medical care.
F.

Physician Disobedience as Call for Further Scrutiny and Possible Legal
Change

A final observation when looking across the ways in which law
enforcement responds to physician violation of the law, is that when physicians
intentionally violate the law to care for patients or engage in actions that might
be categorized as civil disobedience, more often than not, they appear to be
dealt with fairly by the individualized safety valves incorporated in the
criminal justice system. Perhaps, as a result, initiatives to change these laws
are often ineffective. Failure on the part of legislators to respond to bad law
claims where physicians are being criminally prosecuted, however, may be
based on an effort to signal moral wrongdoing rather than on evidence that the
laws are providing greater benefit than harm. In many of these cases,
legislators considered the potential negative patient impact of the laws and
struck a balance between the competing policy and moral arguments that shape
where the line is drawn between legal and illegal activity. While in some
cases, the policy arguments might weigh in favor of repealing the law,
legislators have decided that there are important values or moral reasons to
keep the law in effect.
In many cases, however, the moral values that have tipped the balance in
the legislative equation are not uniformly shared by society. Oftentimes these
moral values may blind legislators to new policy arguments or empirical
evidence. But, legislators should be open to new information and data about
the impact and effectiveness of the laws that they passed, willing to consider a
recalibration of the balance.
When physician lawbreaking in the patient’s interest is fairly isolated, the
criminal justice system may respond appropriately and compassionately. But
when physician lawbreaking based on asserted fiduciary duties to patients
becomes more widespread, policy makers should seek to collect and compile
data on the impact of the law on patients. Initial assumptions underlying the
passage of the law may have been misguided or not empirically supported. For
example, discussions regarding the criminalization of physician-assisted dying
came to the fore during the time that Dr. Jack Kevorkian was assisting
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individuals end their lives.232 The policy arguments put forth by those who
opposed the legalization of physician-assisted suicide included concerns that
vulnerable individuals, including the elderly, women, the uninsured, the poor,
and people with limited education, would be overrepresented in the group of
individuals who would take advantage of the service, as they would be
“considered marginal and expendable and come under pressure to end their
lives prematurely.”233 Ten years of experience and empirical data from
Oregon, where physician-assisted suicide is legal, have shown that these
concerns have not been borne out.234 Instead, the results indicate an
improvement of end of life care in Oregon and, in particular, knowledge of
palliative care and use of hospice.235
Initiatives based on empirical data of the impact of various laws on patient
care may help to persuade policy makers of the need to change existing laws.
On the other hand, policy arguments cannot necessarily counter moral
concerns. Yet, by providing better data to inform policy arguments and
challenge unfounded views, the debate can be narrowed down to the core
issues at stake, whether they are morally, policy, or politically driven.
In conclusion, I agree with Professor Johnson that when we encounter a
situation where physicians complain about bad law because it prevents them
from appropriately treating patients, we should take such claims seriously and
legislators should treat them as sentinel events. This is especially true when
physicians break the law, not out of some selfish motive, but in order to
provide better care to their patients. And, even when doctors who break the
law have motives that are difficult to disentangle but may include dual
motivations, i.e., patient care and economic gain, we should not ignore them
but rather urge greater efforts at evaluating the impact of these laws on patient
care.

232. See supra text accompanying notes 149–62.
233. KATHRYN L. TUCKER, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, CHOICE AT THE
END OF LIFE: LESSONS FROM OREGON 8 (June 2008), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kathryn%20
L.%20Tucker%20Issue%20Brief.pdf (citing Brief for Not Dead Yet et al., as Amici Curiae in
Support of Defendants-Appellants, Glucksberg v. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
234. See Margaret P. Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the
Netherlands: Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable” Groups, 33 J. MED.
ETHICS 591, 597 (2007) (“[W]e found no evidence to justify the grave and important concern
often expressed about the potential for abuse—namely, the fear that legalised physician-assisted
dying will target the vulnerable or pose the greatest risk to people in vulnerable groups.”).
235. See TUCKER, supra note 233, at 9. Based on this data, recently the American Public
Health Association and the American College of Legal Medicine joined the American Medical
Women’s Association and the American Medical Students’ Association in adopting policies
supporting the practice of aid in dying. Id. at 12.

